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In this paper, we study the co-movement of the government budget bal-
ance and the trade balance at business cycle frequencies. In a sample of 10
OECD countries we ﬁnd that the correlation of the two time series is nega-
tive, but less so in more open economies. Moreover, for the US the cross-
correlation function is S-shaped. We analyze these regularities taking the
perspective of international business cycle theory. First, we show that a stan-
dard model delivers predictions broadly in line with the evidence. Second,
we show that conditional on spending shocks the model predicts a perfect
correlation of the budget balance and the trade balance. Yet, the effect of
spending shocks on the trade balance is contained if an economy is not very
open to trade.
Keywords: Fiscal Policy, Twin deﬁcits, Openness, Business Cycle
JEL-Classiﬁcation : F41, F42, E32
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The notion of ‘twin deﬁcits’ emerged in the mid-1980s following the observa-
tion that the US trade balance moved into deﬁcit at a time of increasing gov-
ernment budget deﬁcits, suggesting that ﬁscal expansions caused the positive co-
movement.1 On the other hand, in the debate on the need for ﬁscal consolidation
to correct external imbalances, it has been observed that the correlation between
the two time series is actually very small, or even negative in the data.2
Any assessment of the co-movement of the budget and the trade balance, however,
should take into account that both variables adjust endogenously not only to ﬁscal
shocks but to the entire state of the economy. Therefore, we study the transmission
of both ﬁscal and productivity shocks onto the government budget and net exports,
taking the perspective of international business cycle theory.3
We proceed in two steps. First, we document three regularities concerning the co-
movement of the trade and the budget balance. Using quarterly time series for 10
OECD countries during the period 1973-2005, we show that: i) the contempora-
neous correlation between the budget and the trade balance (both scaled by GDP)
is typically negative at business cycle frequencies: budget surpluses are associated
with trade deﬁcits; ii) the correlation is less negative, the more open countries are
to trade; iii) the cross-correlation for the budget balance and the trade balance in
the US resembles a stretched ‘S’.
Second, we ask whether a standard international real business (IRBC) model can
account for the above regularities. For the sake of transparency, we draw on the
classical contribution by Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland [1994], henceforth BKK,
assuming shocks to technology as well as government spending. To analyze the
behavior of the government budget balance, we assume that government purchases
are ﬁnanced either through issuing debt or by taxing the income of domestic resi-
1Recall that national accounting implies: current account deﬁcit = budget deﬁcit + private invest-
ment - private saving. Hence, unless ﬁscal shocks cause large swings in private net savings, policies
that deteriorate the budget are bound to worsen the trade deﬁcit.
2See e.g. Backus, Henriksen, Lambert, and Telmer [2006] who dismiss the relevance of the twin
deﬁcits hypothesis on the ground of this observation.
3By explicitly taking into account non-ﬁscal shocks for the co-movement of the budget and the
trade balance, this paper complements a line of research which focuses on the transmission of ﬁscal
shocks; see Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust [2005] for an analysis using a general equilibrium model and
Kim and Roubini [2003], Corsetti and M¨ uller [2006], Monacelli and Perotti [2006] and Beetsma,
Giuliodori, and Klaasen [2007] using VAR models.
2dents.4
We ﬁnd that the model is able to replicate the empirical regularities, notably the
negative correlation of the budget and the trade balance. However, simulating
the model for each shock in isolation shows that the correlation is perfect con-
ditional on domestic government spending shocks: consistent with the notion of
twin deﬁcits, ﬁscal expansions cause a joint deterioration of the budget and the
trade balance. Yet, an almost perfect correlation does not translate into an eco-
nomically signiﬁcant effect: we ﬁnd only a very small effect of ﬁscal shocks on
the trade balance if an economy is relatively closed.
2 Properties of the data
In this section we characterize the business cycle properties of the primary budget
balance and the trade balance. We consider quarterly time series for 10 OCED
countries covering the post-Bretton Woods period 1973-2005. Table 1 displays
several statistics of the HP-ﬁltered series of net exports, nx, the primary govern-
ment budget balance, bb, and real output, y.5
The ﬁrst two panels of Table 1 show that standard deviations and autocorrelations
display considerable variation across the 10 countries in our sample. However, the
contemporaneous correlation of the trade balance and the budget balance, shown
in the third panel of the table, is negative everywhere except in the Netherlands and
Canada, where it is nonetheless close to zero. The correlation between the primary
budgetbalanceandoutputispositiveinallcountries, whilethecorrelationbetween
the trade balance and output is generally negative, as stressed by the early IRBC
literature.
Next, we ask whether the correlation of the budget and the trade balance vary with
4Note that we adopt a parsimonious model setup in order to convey our main argument in a
transparent and efﬁcient way; namely that non-ﬁscal shocks are important for the co-movement of
the trade and the budget balance. Clearly, quantitative aspects of our analysis might be reﬁned using
richer speciﬁcations.
5We use a smoothing parameter of 1600. All data are obtained from the OECD economic outlook
database (Economic Outlook 81, Annual and Quarterly data, Vol. 2007 release 1). The primary
budget balance in percent of GDP is available at quarterly frequency for the following OECD 10
countries: Australia, Canada, Finland, Ireland, Japan, Republic of Korea, Netherlands, Sweden,
United Kingdom, United States. The trade balance is computed as the difference of exports and
imports scaled by GDP, at current prices. Data for Korea and the Netherlands are only available from
1975 and 1980, respectively. In the working paper version of this paper we also compute statistics
using annual time series for 16 countries, see Corsetti and M¨ uller [2007].
3Table 1: Properties of net exports, output and the budget balance
Standard deviation
(percent) Autocorrelation Correlation
nx y bb nx y bb (nx,bb) (nx,y) (bb,y)
AUS 1:06 1:38 1:04 0:76 0:74 0:87 ¡0:23 ¡0:21 0:62
CAN 0:94 1:46 1:29 0:72 0:89 0:78 0:02 0:05 0:63
FIN 1:67 2:14 1:67 0:44 0:87 0:94 ¡0:05 ¡0:30 0:67
GBR 0:99 1:49 1:32 0:66 0:85 0:71 ¡0:15 ¡0:34 0:31
IRL 1:95 1:66 1:27 0:79 0:77 0:92 ¡0:03 ¡0:17 0:17
JPN 0:75 1:38 0:71 0:85 0:81 0:92 ¡0:30 ¡0:42 0:45
KOR 2:90 2:55 0:97 0:73 0:84 0:90 ¡0:28 ¡0:43 0:52
NLD 0:90 1:15 0:99 0:45 0:76 0:89 0:02 ¡0:03 0:35
SWE 1:10 1:38 2:08 0:45 0:69 0:92 ¡0:00 ¡0:09 0:57
USA 0:45 1:59 1:12 0:78 0:88 0:81 ¡0:34 ¡0:45 0:74
HP-ﬁltered quarterly data 1973-2005. Source: OECD Economic Outlook; nx: trade bal-
ance, bb: primary government budget balance (both scaled by GDP), y: real GDP.
























Figure 1: Correlation of trade balance, nx, and budget balance, bb; left panel: contemporaneous
correlation vs. average import share for 10 OECD countries and model (dashed line); right panel: ccf
for US data (solid line and shaded area for 95 percent conﬁdence bounds) and model (dashed line,
baseline calibration), vertical axis: ½(bbt;nxt+k), horizontal axis: k.
the degree of openness of a country, as measured by the import share in GDP
(openness). The left panel of Figure 1 plots these two variables against each other
for the countries in our sample. As our second ﬁnding, we note that, by and large,
the correlation is less negative, the more open an economy.
Finally, we focus on the dynamic relationship between the budget balance and the
trade balance in the US, plotting the cross-correlation function (ccf) of bbt and
nxt+k for k = ¡8:::8 in the right panel of Figure 1. As our third ﬁnding, we
note that for the US the ccf resembles a stretched ‘S’.
43 The model
Can the empirical regularities established above be accounted for by a standard in-
ternational business cycle model? Are these facts inconsistent with the twin deﬁcit
hypothesis? In the rest of this paper we address these questions by adopting a par-
simonious speciﬁcation of the BKK model.6 The main features of the model are
as follows. Letting cit denote consumption and nit the amount of labor supplied,









it(1 ¡ nit)1¡¹]1¡°: (1)
Households supply labor and rent capital to a representative ﬁrm which produces
a country-speciﬁc intermediate good, denoted by a and b, in country 1 and 2,
respectively. Labor and capital are internationally immobile; households in each
country own the capital stock kit of that country. Investment, xit, increases the
existing capital stock in the following way,
kit+1 = (1 ¡ ±)kit + xit; (2)
where ± is the depreciation rate. Households’ labor and capital income are both
taxed at the same rate, ¿it. Households maximize (1) subject to (2), a no-Ponzi-
game condition and a budget constraint, where we allow for international trade in
a complete set of state-contingent securities.




where zit is an exogenous technology shock. Deﬁning zt+1 = [z1t z2t]
0, we as-
sume zt+1 = Azt + "z
t+1, where "z
t+1 is a bivariate vector of innovations to tech-
nology. The law of one price holds for intermediate goods a and b. Final goods,
6The model differs from BKK in two respects: First, we assume that government spending falls
entirely on domestic goods, because of the evidence discussed in Corsetti and M¨ uller [2006] sug-
gesting that the import content in government spending is generally less than half the import content
in private spending. As a ﬁrst approximation it is thus reasonable to assume zero import content in
government spending. Second, we assume that governments have no access to lump-sum taxes but
instead levy a ﬂat tax rate on income, which adjusts to the level of government debt.




















; for i = 2
(4)
where ¾ is the elasticity of substitution between goods a and b and ! measures
the home bias in ﬁnal goods. Firms are operating under perfect competition both
at the intermediate and ﬁnal good level. Domestic households thus earn the entire
domestic intermediate output as income.
Government purchases, git, are purely dissipate and ﬁnanced by taxing income
or by issuing risk-free debt, dit. Letting Rt denote the risk-free interest rate, the
period budget constraint of the government is given by
dit+1R¡1
t ¡ dit = git ¡ ¿ityit: (5)
Government spending is determined exogenously as follows
git = (1 ¡ ½g)gi + ½ggit¡1 + "
g
it; (6)




spending. The tax rate adjusts to the level of debt scaled by steady state output, yi:




where Á measures the debt-elasticity of the tax rate. In our analysis below, taking
the perspective of country 1, we focus on the co-movement of the primary budget
balance scaled by GDP, (¿1ty1t ¡g1t)=y1t and the trade balance (a2t ¡ptb1t)=y1t,
where pt denotes the terms of trade measured as the price of good b relative to the
price of good a.
4 Properties of theoretical economies
We study the business cycle properties of the model using log-linear approxima-
tion of the equilibrium conditions near a symmetric zero-debt steady state.7 To
7The statistics reported below are the average over 20 simulations of 132 quarters each. We use
500 observations to initialize the model. In accordance which the statistics reported in section 2
above we also apply the HP ﬁlter to the simulated time series.
6calibratethemodelwefollowBKK,asregardsboththeparametersgoverningpref-
erences and technology, and the forcing processes in technology and government
spending. Note that as government spending is assumed to fall entirely on do-
mestically produced goods, assuming an import share of 15 percent in ﬁnal goods
(! = 0:85) implies an import share of 12 percent of GDP, the average value in US
time series.8 To pin down Á, we aim at matching the degree of autocorrelation of
the budget balance in US data, which is equal to 0:81, subject to the constraint that
the path of government debt is non explosive. We ﬁnd that the constraint is bind-
ing at Á = 0:0143, implying that the tax rate adjusts very slowly to government
debt. As a result, ﬂuctuations in government spending and output induce persistent
movements in the government budget balance.
In a ﬁrst step, we assess the ability of the calibrated model to account for the key
features of the data regarding twin deﬁcits, openness and the business cycle. In
Table 2 we compare second moments of US time series (ﬁrst line) with those gen-
erated by the model under our baseline calibration (second line). The contempora-
neous correlation of the ‘twins’ is negative. The budget and trade balance show a
stronger correlation with output than in the data, but of the right sign. The theoreti-
cal standard deviation of the trade balance is somewhat below those characterizing
in US time series; the model does slightly better in matching the volatility of out-
put, but not as well as regards the budget balance. By the same token, the three
variables show less persistence in the model than in the data.
In Figure 1 we assess the performance of the model in two additional dimensions.
In the left panel the dashed line plots the contemporaneous correlation of the trade
and the budget balance against openness. The model is able to replicate a key
feature characterizing the cross-section of the data, namely the positive association
between openness and the correlation of the budget and the trade balance. In the
right panel, the dashed line displays the ccf implied by the baseline calibration of
the model, which is close to the empirical cross-correlation function for the US. In
light of our numerical results, we ﬁnd that, overall, the model is able to provide a
satisfactory account of the empirical regularities characterizing the co-movement
of the budget and trade balance.
8See Corsetti and M¨ uller [2007] for a list of the parameter values used in the baseline spec-
iﬁcation and sensitivity analyses showing the robustness of our results with respect to alternative
speciﬁcations.
7Table 2: Properties of Key Variables in Theoretical Economies
Standard deviation
(percent) Autocorrelation Correlation
nx y bb nx y bb (nx,bb) (nx,y) (bb,y)









































































First row reports data moments for US, see Table 1; consecutive rows contain theoretical
counterparts for different assumptions on forcing process; for theoretical moments standard
deviations are in parentheses.
We thus turn to counterfactual experiments and simulate the model drawing from
the distribution of each shock in isolation. Results are shown in rows 2 to 5 of
Table 2, which report the second moments predicted by the model for the main
variables of interest, conditional on speciﬁc shocks.
Threeobservations are in order. First, the contemporaneous correlation of the trade
and the budget balance conditional on domestic government spending shocks is
perfect (third row). This squares well with the notion of twin deﬁcits whereby
ﬁscal shocks induce co-movement of the budget and the trade balance. Second,
the correlation is strongly negative conditional on technology shocks (fourth row).
Third, technology shocks seem to dominate the unconditional correlation which is
close to the correlation conditional on technology shocks. Put differently, govern-
ment spending shocks and foreign technology shocks have only a limited effect on
the unconditional moments of the simulated data.9
The strong positive correlation of the trade and the budget balance that the model
predicts conditional on government spending shocks, however, does not necessar-
ily imply a strong economic effect of ﬁscal shocks on the trade balance. To clarify
this issue, we display in the columns of Figure 2 the impulse responses to each
of the four shocks, both for the baseline economy (solid line) and a model econ-
omy which is identical to the baseline case except for a higher import share of 30
percent (line with diamonds).
9The last row of Table 2 reports the moments conditional on both domestic shocks. In Corsetti
and M¨ uller [2007] we also report the conditional ccf illustrating how domestic technology shocks
dominate the unconditional correlation.

































































































Figure 2: Shock transmission in theoretical economies. Notes: Columns 1-4 show, in turn, effect
of shocks to domestic and foreign government spending and domestic and foreign technology; solid
linesdisplayresponsesofbaselineeconomy(12percentimportshare: ! = 0:85), linewithdiamonds
corresponds to an economy with import share of 30 percent (! = 0:625). vertical axis: percent of
GDP, horizontal axis: quarters.
In the ﬁrst column we show the responses to an increase of government spending
by one percent of GDP: it decreases consumption and investment, and raises out-
put by about 0:5 on impact (baseline economy). The trade balance falls, but its
movement is quite contained (about 0:1 percent), while the budget balance moves
into a signiﬁcant deﬁcit (about 0:85 percent). So, while the conditional correlation
of the trade and the budget balance is virtually perfect, only a small fraction of the
ﬁscal expansion is reﬂected in the trade balance.
The picture changes considerably in economies which are more open to trade. In
this case, the effect of ﬁscal shocks on the trade balance increases signiﬁcantly,
a result which is analyzed in detail by Corsetti and M¨ uller [2006] and Corsetti,
Meier, and M¨ uller [2007]. We observe that the response of output is virtually
9unaltered, but the responses of investment and consumption increase relative to
the baseline scenario. Hence, the trade balance falls signiﬁcantly.
Figure 2 also reports the effect of an increase in foreign government spending,
displayedinthesecondcolumn: domesticconsumptionandinvestmentfall; yetthe
economy experiences mild trade and budget surpluses. To complete our analysis,
columns three and four show the effects of technology shocks in the domestic
country and abroad. As in BKK, a domestic technology shock worsens the trade
balance, because investment and consumption rise more than output in the short
run. Symmetrically, the trade balance improves if the technology shock originates
in the foreign country. The budget balance improves persistently in response to a
domestic technology shock: as government spending is constant and the tax rate
responds slowly to government debt, tax revenues move proportional to domestic
output. Domestic technology shocks thus induce a negative correlation of budget
and trade balance, but less so, the more open the economy.10
5 Conclusion
In this paper we reconsider the notion of twin deﬁcits in light of empirical evidence
from a sample of 10 OECD countries, and quantitative results from a standard
international business cycle model.
Our analysis highlights two points which are potentially relevant for the policy
debate on twin deﬁcits. First, the negative correlation found in the data is not in-
consistent with the twin deﬁcit hypothesis: our results suggest that conditional on
ﬁscal shocks, the budget and the trade balance co-move strongly, although their
overall correlation is determined by other shocks driving the business cycle. Sec-
ond, even if conditional on ﬁscal shocks the correlation between the two deﬁcits
is positive and strong, the quantitative response of the trade balance may still be
quite contained, especially in economies with a low import share in GDP.
10The correlation becomes less negative in more open economies, because the terms of trade
depreciation following the technology shock alters the intertemporal margin governing investment
decisions, see Corsetti and M¨ uller [2006] for a discussion of the underlying mechanism in the context
of ﬁscal shocks. Corsetti and M¨ uller [2007] consider alternative values for Á ﬁnding some effect on
the response of nx to ﬁscal shocks. As a result, the correlation between the trade and the budget
balance conditional on spending shocks falls for higher values of Á, but remains positive.
10A Data
Inthemaintextwecomputedstatisticsusingquarterlytimeseries, therebylimiting
the sample to 10 OCED countries. Annual time series data are available for 16
countries, plotted in Figure A1.




































































Figure A 1: Annual time series for the primary government budget balance (solid line) and the
trade balance (circles) for 16 OECD countries: 1973-2005
We also compute the statistics reported in Table 1 for all 16 countries after HP-
ﬁltering - using a smoothing parameter of 100. The results, displayed in Table
A1, show that the correlation between the budget and the trade balance is mostly
negative - as with quarterly data. In Figure A2 we plot the correlation of the budget
and the trade balance both for quarterly data (left panel) and for annual data (right
panel) against openness. In both cases the relationship between openness and the
correlation of the budget and the trade balance is positive, signiﬁcantly so only in
the case of quarterly data.
11Table A 1: Properties of net exports, output and the budget balance
Standard deviation
(percent) Autocorrelation Correlation
nx y bb nx y bb (nx,bb) (nx,y) (bb,y)
Australia 0:95 1:66 1:42 ¡0:04 0:53 0:68 ¡0:18 ¡0:18 0:83
Austria 0:84 1:32 1:03 0:28 0:43 0:35 0:16 ¡0:23 0:35
Belgium 0:81 1:41 1:34 0:58 0:40 0:39 0:30 ¡0:63 0:10
Canada 1:15 2:15 1:76 0:49 0:64 0:62 0:13 ¡0:08 0:61
Denmark 1:29 1:90 2:68 0:43 0:54 0:70 ¡0:50 ¡0:63 0:81
Spain 1:49 2:12 1:04 0:55 0:78 0:58 ¡0:29 ¡0:65 0:60
Finland 1:81 3:52 2:77 0:53 0:77 0:67 ¡0:02 ¡0:35 0:83
France 0:85 1:37 0:91 0:24 0:67 0:55 ¡0:10 ¡0:35 0:46
UK 1:14 2:07 2:05 0:49 0:70 0:72 ¡0:35 ¡0:54 0:57
Greece 1:08 2:61 1:25 0:42 0:52 0:30 0:31 ¡0:01 ¡0:01
Ireland 2:57 2:95 1:59 0:37 0:72 0:40 0:10 ¡0:29 0:08
Iceland 3:02 3:03 1:64 0:21 0:64 0:15 ¡0:41 ¡0:32 0:35
Italy 1:24 1:57 1:11 0:37 0:46 0:21 0:08 ¡0:51 0:07
Japan 0:81 1:92 1:16 0:51 0:65 0:65 ¡0:05 ¡0:50 0:41
Sweden 1:23 1:99 3:52 0:37 0:68 0:65 ¡0:05 ¡0:32 0:80
USA 0:59 1:99 1:45 0:63 0:55 0:56 ¡0:23 ¡0:54 0:74
HP-ﬁltered annual data for 1973-2005. Source: OECD Economic Outlook; nx: trade bal-
ance, bb: primary government budget balance (both scaled by GDP), y: real GDP
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Figure A 2: Correlation of trade balance, nx, and budget balance, bb, vs. openness; left panel:
quarterly data slope coefﬁcient of regression line is 0.60 (s.e. 0.21); right panel: annual data slope
coefﬁcient is 0.54 (s.e. 0.40)
B Model solution
To solve the model, we ﬁrst complete the problem of households and ﬁrms, dis-
cussed in the main text. As in Heathcote and Perri [2002], let qa
it and qb
it denote the
prices of goods a and b in country i in units of the ﬁnal good produced in country i.
Further, let wit and rit denote the real wage rate and the real return on capital, both
in terms of domestic intermediate goods. Let Qt;t+1 denote the stochastic discount
12factor used to price the portfolio of securities in period t, At+1. Then the risk
free interest rate is deﬁned by R¡1
t = EtQt;t+1 and the representative household’s
budget constraint is given by




it[(1 ¡ ¿it)(witnit + ritkit)] + qa
itAit ¡ qa
itEtQt;t+1Ait+1; for i = 1
qb
it[(1 ¡ ¿it)(witnit + ritkit)] + qa
itAit ¡ qa
itEtQt;t+1Ait+1; for i = 2









subject to (4). The intermediate goods objective is given by
max
kit;nit
(yit ¡ witnit ¡ ritkit); (B 3)
subject to (3).
Given initial values for household wealth and a speciﬁcation of the tax rule (7)
which is consistent with government solvency, an equilibrium is given by a set
of prices for all t ¸ 0 such that when ﬁrms and households take prices as given,
households maximize (1) subject to (2), (B1) and a no-Ponzi game condition,
ﬁrms solve their static problems (B3) and (B2) and all markets clear for any
particular realization of the shock processes for technology and for government
spending, both given by BKK.
Market clearing for intermediate goods requires that
y1t = a1t + a2t + g1t (B 4)
y2t = b1t + b2t + g2t; (B 5)
while market clearing for ﬁnal goods requires that
fit = cit + xit; i = 1;2: (B 6)
The asset market clears by Walras’ law.
Wesolvethemodelnumericallybyapproximatingtheﬁrstorderconditionsaround
a symmetric zero-debt steady state. To derive the ﬁrst order conditions, let ¸t de-
note the multiplier on the budget constraint. Optimality of the household program
13then requires (the index ‘i’ is dropped to simplify the exposition) the following to
hold
uc(ct;nt) = ¸t (B 7)
un(ct;nt) = ¡¸tqa
t (1 ¡ ¿t)wt (B 8)
¸tqa









t+1(1 ¡ ¿t+1)rt+1 + ¸t+1(1 ¡ ±)
¤
n (B 10)
Combining the ﬁrst order condition for state-contingent securities in country 1 and
2 and iterating backwards gives the risk sharing condition (see, for instance, Chari,















1 , b1 = (qb











2 , a2 = (qa
2)¡¾(1 ¡ !)f2: (B 15)
The ﬁrst order conditions to (B3) deﬁne the wage and the rental rate of capital (in
terms of intermediate goods)








We consider a symmetric steady state with balanced trade such that a2 = b1 and
zero government debt. For simplicity we focus our analysis on country 1 (sym-
metric expressions hold for country 2). First, we relate the home bias parameter
! to openness, i.e. the share of imports in GDP. Divide the FOC for a1, equation
(B12), by the FOC for b1, equation (B13). Noting that because of symmetry the










14Letting wd denote the share of output net of government spending (y0 = y ¡ g)
which is not exported (=not imported) in steady state we have
a1 = wdy0
1 b1 = (1 ¡ wd)y0
1: (B 19)
Substituting into (B18) gives ! = wd: Hence, the home bias parameter ! mea-
sures the share of net output which is not exported, and 1 ¡ ! is a measure for
openness, as it measures imports (=exports) as a share of net output in steady state.
Let g denote the steady state share of government spending in GDP and assume
that government spending falls on domestic goods only. Such that
y0 = y ¡ g = (1 ¡ g)y
We can then pin down ! on the basis of (B19) using the share of imports in total
output (which is observable):










Total ﬁnal goods f equal net output in steady state y0, which can be seen by sub-
stituting (B19) into the production function for ﬁnal goods, i.e. the Armington
aggregator given by (4). Relative to the speciﬁcation of the weights in the Arm-
ington aggregator in BKK, we thus impose a priori that y0 = f: 11 This in turn
implies
c1 + x1 = f1 = y0
1 = y1 ¡ g1 , y1 = c1 + x1 + g1;
i.e. in steady state, consumption, investment and government spending add up to
total GDP.
Next, we consider relative prices in steady state. Applying the Euler theorem to

































11In BKK the weights in the Armington aggregator are set such as intermediate output is equal to
ﬁnal goods in steady state, see also Ravn [1997].
15Note again that in steady state qa
1 = qb
1 and exploiting symmetry (a2 = b1) yields
f1 = qa




1 = 1: (B 21)
The above allows us to evaluate the FOC for kt+1 in steady state and to derive the
capital-GDP-ratio in steady state:
ky =
µ¯(1 ¡ ¿)
1 ¡ ¯ (1 ¡ ±)
The law of motion for capital implies that xy = ±ky:For consumption this implies




= (1 ¡ gy) => cy = 1 ¡ gy ¡ ±ky:
Combining the FOC for hours and consumption in steady state implies:
n =
¹(1 ¡ ¿)(1 ¡ µ)yc
1 + ¹((1 ¡ ¿)(1 ¡ µ)yc ¡ 1)
such that, given cy, the parameters µ;¿ and ¹, pin down hours in steady state.
Assuming zero debt in steady state we have from equation (5): ¿ = gy.
In the following, we list the linearized equilibrium conditions that we use in the
actual simulation of the model, denoting their sequence with an ’X’. Unless noted
otherwise all variables denote percentage deviations from steady state. Market
clearing for intermediate goods (B 4) is approximated as
y1t = !(1 ¡ gy)a1t + (1 ¡ !)(1 ¡ gy)a2t + ^ g1t (X1)
y2t = !(1 ¡ gy)b2t + (1 ¡ !)(1 ¡ gy)b1t + ^ g2t; (X2)
where ^ gt = (gt ¡ g)=y. Market clearing for ﬁnal goods (B 6) is approximated as
(1 ¡ gy)f1t = cyc1t + xyx1t (X3)
(1 ¡ gy)f2t = cyc2t + xyx2t (X4)
Production function of intermediate goods (3) is approximated as
y1t = z1t + µk1t + (1 ¡ µ)n1t (X5)
y2t = z2t + µk2t + (1 ¡ µ)n2t (X6)
Production function of ﬁnal goods (4) is approximated as
f1t = !a1t + (1 ¡ !)b1t (X7)
f2t = !b2t + (1 ¡ !)a2t (X8)
16Demand for intermediate goods (B 12)-(B 15) is approximated as
a1t = ¡¾qa
1t + f1t (X9)
b1t = ¡¾qb
1t + f1t (X10)
b2t = ¡¾qb
2t + f2t (X11)
a2t = ¡¾qa
2t + f2t (X12)
The ﬁrst order conditions (FOC) for consumption are
¸1t = (¹(1 ¡ °) ¡ 1)c1t ¡
n
1 ¡ n
(1 ¡ ¹)(1 ¡ °)n1t (X13)
¸2t = (¹(1 ¡ °) ¡ 1)c2t ¡
n
1 ¡ n
(1 ¡ ¹)(1 ¡ °)n2t (X14)






















[°(1 ¡ ¹) + ¹]
¾
n2t (X16)
The FOCs for capital are




¿1t+1 + r1t+1) + Et¸1t+1(X17)




¿2t+1 + r2t+1) + Et¸2t+1(X18)
The FOCs for intermediate good ﬁrms (B16) and (B17) are
r1t = y1t ¡ k1t (X19)
r2t = y2t ¡ k2t (X20)
w1t = y1t ¡ n1t (X21)
w2t = y2t ¡ n2t (X22)
The law of motion of capital in the two countries is
k1t+1 = (1 ¡ ±)k1t + ±x1t (X23)
k2t+1 = (1 ¡ ±)k2t + ±x2t (X24)
17By linearizing the risk sharing condition (B11) we obtain
¸1t + qa
1t = ¸2t + qa
2t (X25)
To close the model, we require that the law of one price holds, i.e. the relative price
of each good is identical across countries. Therefore we deﬁne the real exchange







As regard the government, approximating (5) gives
¯ ^ d1t+1 ¡ ^ d1t = g1t ¡ ¿¿1t ¡ ¿y1t (X28)
¯ ^ d2t+1 ¡ ^ d2t = g2t ¡ ¿¿2t ¡ ¿y2t; (X29)
where ^ dt = dt=y: The tax rule (7) is already linear. Note however that below we
use ¿t to denote percentage deviations from steady state, i.e. ¿it¡¿
¿ :
¿¿1t = Á^ d1t (X30)
¿¿2t = Á^ d2t: (X31)
These equations characterize the equilibrium in the neighborhood of the steady
state, given the processes for the shocks. In addition, we deﬁne the primary budget
balance
bb1t = ¿¿1t ¡ g1t + gyy1t (X32)
bb2t = ¿¿2t ¡ g2t + gyy1t; (X33)




and, ﬁnally, the trade balance
nxt = (1 ¡ !)(1 ¡ gy)(a2t ¡ b1t ¡ pt) (X35)
Rewriting (6) gives
^ g1t+1 = ½g^ g1t + gy"1t (X36)
^ g2t+1 = ½g^ g2t + gy"2t (X37)
For technology we have two additional equations, given the exogenous process for
technology speciﬁed by BKK.
18C Sensitivity analyses
The simulations of the model discussed in the main text are based on assigning
parameter values for the structural model parameters, listed in Table C1.
Table C 1: Parameter values of theoretical economies
Discount factor (steady state) ¯ = 0:99
Consumption share ¹ = 0:34
Risk aversion ° = 2
Capital share µ = 0:36
Depreciation rate ± = 0:025
Home bias (steady state) ! = 0:85
Fraction of government spending (steady state) gy = 0:2
Trade elasticity ¾ = 1:5
Debt stabilization Á = 0:0143
Notes: deep parameter values are taken from BKK;







































Figure C 1: Cross-correlation function for the budget-output-ratio and the net export-output ratio
in theoretical economies. Notes: ccf computed conditional on speciﬁc shocks indicated by letter
on top of panel; vertical axis ½(bbt;nxt+k), horizontal axis: k. Solid line: baseline speciﬁcation;
diamonds: low trade price elasticity; squares: high trade price elasticity; circles: import content in
government spending
In the following we perform a sensitivity analysis to explore the robustness of
our results with respect to alternative model speciﬁcations. A ﬁrst set of vari-
ations concerns the value of the trade price elasticity ¾ and the extent of home
19Table C 2: Moments for alternative model speciﬁcations
Stand. deviation
(percent) Autocorrelation Correlation
nx y bb nx y bb (nx,bb) (nx,y) (bb,y)





































































































































































































































































































Notes: see Table 2.
bias in government spending. Speciﬁcally, we consider a low value for the trade
price elasticity of 0:2 and a high value, 3. Regarding government spending we
assume in a third experiment that government spending has the same import con-

































































































Figure C 2: Transmission for alternative model speciﬁcations; see Figure 2 Solid line: baseline
speciﬁcation; diamonds: lowtradepriceelasticity; squares: hightradepriceelasticity; circles: import
content in government spending.
tent as private spending (12 percent). In table C2 we report the unconditional and
conditional moments for all speciﬁcations, while ﬁgure C1 displays both the un-
conditional (lower right panel) and the conditional ccf. Figure C2 displays the
corresponding impulse responses. Generally, the results are similar to those ob-
tained under the baseline speciﬁcation of the model. An interesting exception is
the case of a low trade price elasticity. In this case, the correlation of the trade
and the budget balance is negative. As shown by Figure C2, the reason is that the
trade balance improves in response to a government spending shock: with a low
trade price elasticity and complete ﬁnancial markets, valuation effects dominate
substitution effects, a possibility discussed in detail in M¨ uller [2006].
21Table C 3: Moments for alternative ﬁscal rules
Stand. deviation
(percent) Autocorrelation Correlation
nx y bb nx y bb (nx,bb) (nx,y) (bb,y)





































































































































































































































































































Notes: see Table 2.
A second experiment concerns the ﬁscal rule. Instead of determining the parame-
ter value for the debt elasticity of the tax rate, Á, by matching the autocorrelation
of the budget balance, we consider a range of values. Results are reported in table
C 3 and ﬁgure C3. It turns out that the value Á has some bearing on the response

































































































FigureC3: Transmission for alternativeﬁscal rules; see Figure 2 Solid line: baseline speciﬁcation;
diamonds: Á = 0:1; squares: Á = 0:3; circles: Á = 1.
of the trade balance notably to ﬁscal shocks: the stronger the response of taxes
to debt, the stronger the fall in investment. Hence, one may actually observe an
increase in the trade balance in the early period after the shock. Overall, however,
the conditional correlations are qualitatively similar to those obtained under the
baseline speciﬁcation: conditional on spending shocks the contemporaneous cor-
relation of the budget and the trade balance is positive, conditional on technology
shocks it is negative - as is the unconditional correlation.
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